Stealing Links from Graph Neural Networks by He, Xinlei et al.
Stealing Links from Graph Neural Networks
Xinlei He1 Jinyuan Jia2 Michael Backes1 Neil Zhenqiang Gong2 Yang Zhang1
1CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security 2Duke University
Abstract
Graph data, such as social networks and chemical networks,
contains a wealth of information that can help to build pow-
erful applications. To fully unleash the power of graph data,
a family of machine learning models, namely graph neural
networks (GNNs), is introduced. Empirical results show that
GNNs have achieved state-of-the-art performance in various
tasks.
Graph data is the key to the success of GNNs. High-
quality graph is expensive to collect and often contains sen-
sitive information, such as social relations. Various research
has shown that machine learning models are vulnerable to at-
tacks against their training data. Most of these models focus
on data from the Euclidean space, such as images and texts.
Meanwhile, little attention has been paid to the security and
privacy risks of graph data used to train GNNs.
In this paper, we aim at filling the gap by proposing
the first link stealing attacks against graph neural networks.
Given a black-box access to a GNN model, the goal of an
adversary is to infer whether there exists a link between any
pair of nodes in the graph used to train the model. We pro-
pose a threat model to systematically characterize the adver-
sary’s background knowledge along three dimensions. By
combination, we obtain a comprehensive taxonomy of 8 dif-
ferent link stealing attacks. We propose multiple novel meth-
ods to realize these attacks. Extensive experiments over 8
real-world datasets show that our attacks are effective at in-
ferring links, e.g., AUC (area under the ROC curve) is above
0.95 in multiple cases.
1 Introduction
The past decade has witnessed the tremendous progress of
machine learning (ML). Nowadays, ML models have been
deployed in various domains, including image classifica-
tion [30, 38], machine translation [4, 70], and recommen-
dation system [31, 79]. Many current machine learning
applications concentrate on data in the Euclidean space,
such as images and texts. Meanwhile, graph data, e.g.,
social networks and chemical networks, contains a wealth
of information which can help to build powerful applica-
tions [13, 14, 26, 44, 50, 60, 63, 82, 83, 85, 86]. To fully un-
leash the power of graph data, a whole family of ML mod-
els, namely graph neural networks (GNNs), has been pro-
posed [28, 32, 37, 75, 80].
As one of the most popular ML models during the past
three years, GNNs have achieved state-of-the-art perfor-
mance in various tasks, e.g., social network recommenda-
tion [20,57,80] and chemical property prediction [19,23,71].
The goal of a GNN is to predict labels for nodes in a graph.
To train a GNN model, one needs a dataset containing both
nodes’ attributes and a graph linking all these nodes. The for-
mer is the same as datasets used for training other ML mod-
els, e.g., multilayer perceptron (MLP), convolutional neural
networks (CNNs), and recurrent neural networks (RNNs).
The latter, i.e., the graph, is the key to GNNs’ success.
Recently, various research has shown that machine learn-
ing models are vulnerable to attacks against their training
data [12,21,22,24,33,34,39,40,42,46,47,54,58,62,64–66,
72]. So far, most of these attacks have focused on ML mod-
els using data from the Euclidean space, e.g., MLP, CNNs,
and RNNs. Meanwhile, very little attention has been paid
to GNNs, in particular, the security and privacy risks of the
graph data used to train GNNs.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose the first attacks aiming at steal-
ing links from GNNs, which we refer to as link stealing at-
tacks. Specifically, given a black-box access to a target GNN
model, the goal of an adversary is to predict whether there
exists a link between any pair of nodes in the dataset used
to train the target GNN model. We refer to the dataset as
the target dataset. Successful link stealing attacks can lead
to severe consequences. For instance, an adversary stealing
the underlying links from the target dataset directly violates
the intellectual property of the target model owner. Also,
when a GNN is trained on sensitive data, such as social net-
work data, leakage of two users’ link, i.e., social relation,
may jeopardize their privacy to a large extent.
We propose a threat model to characterize the adversary’s
background knowledge along three dimensions, i.e., the tar-
get dataset’s nodes’ attributes, the target dataset’s partial
graph, and an auxiliary dataset called shadow dataset which
also contains its own nodes’ attributes and graph. By jointly
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considering whether the adversary has each of these knowl-
edge, we obtain a comprehensive taxonomy of 8 different
types of link stealing attacks.
We implement our attacks with multiple novel method-
ologies. For instance, when the adversary only has the tar-
get dataset’s nodes’ attributes, we design an unsupervised
attack by calculating the distance between two nodes’ at-
tributes. When the target dataset’s partial graph is available,
we use supervised learning to train a binary classifier as our
attack model with features summarized from two nodes’ at-
tributes and predictions obtained from the black-box access
to the target GNN model. When the adversary has a shadow
dataset, we propose a transferring attack which transfers the
knowledge from the shadow dataset to the target dataset to
mount the link stealing attack.
We evaluate all our 8 attacks over 8 real-world datasets.
Extensive results show that our attacks in general achieve
high AUC (area under the ROC curve) at inferring links be-
tween node pairs. Our results demonstrate that the predic-
tions of a target GNN model encode rich information about
the structure of a graph that is used to train the model, and
our attacks can exploit them to steal the graph structure.
We also observe that more knowledge leads to better at-
tack performance in general. For instance, on the Citeseer
dataset [37], when an adversary has all the three types of
knowledge, the attack achieves 0.977 AUC. On the same
dataset, when the adversary only has nodes’ attributes, the
AUC is 0.878. Moreover, we discover that the three types of
knowledge have different impacts on our attacks. The target
dataset’s partial graph is the strongest predictor followed by
nodes’ attributes, the shadow dataset, on the other hand, is
the weakest. Our proposed transferring attack can achieve
high AUC. Moreover, our transferring attack achieves better
performance if the shadow dataset comes from the same do-
main as the target dataset, e.g., both of them are chemical
networks. We believe this is due to the fact that similar types
of graphs have analogous graph structures, which leads to
less information loss during the transferring phase.
In summary, we make the following contributions in this
paper.
• We propose the first set of link stealing attacks against
graph neural networks.
• We propose a threat model to comprehensively char-
acterize an adversary’s background knowledge along
three dimensions. Moreover, we propose 8 different
link stealing attacks for adversaries with different back-
ground knowledge.
• We extensively evaluate our 8 attacks over 8 real-world
datasets. Our results show that our attacks can steal
links from a GNN model effectively.
1.2 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we introduce graph neural networks. Section 3 presents our
threat model and attack definition. Methodologies of our 8
attacks are introduced in Section 4. Section 5 presents our
experimental evaluation results. Section 6 discusses some
related work and we conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 Graph Neural Networks
Many important real-world datasets come in the form of
graphs or networks, e.g., social networks, knowledge graph,
and chemical networks. Therefore, it is urgent to develop
machine learning algorithms to fully utilize graph data. To
this end, a new family of machine learning algorithms,
i.e., graph neural networks (GNNs), has been proposed and
shown superior performance in various tasks [2, 16, 37, 75].
Training a GNN Model. Given a graph, attributes for each
node in the graph, and a small number of labeled nodes,
GNN trains a neural network to predict labels of the remain-
ing unlabeled nodes via analyzing the graph structure and
node attributes. Formally, we define the target dataset as
D = (A ,F ), where A is the adjacency matrix of the graph
and F contains all nodes’ attributes. Specifically, Auv is an
element in A : if there exists an edge between node u and
node v, then Auv = 1, otherwise Auv = 0. Moreover, Fu rep-
resents the attributes of u. V is a set containing all nodes in
the graph. Note that we consider undirected graphs in this
paper, i.e., ∀u,v ∈ V ,Auv = Avu.
A GNN method iteratively updates a node’s features via
aggregating its neighbors’ features using a neural network,
whose last layer predicts labels for nodes. Different GNN
methods use slightly different aggregation rules. For in-
stance, graph convolutional network (GCN), the most rep-
resentative and well-established GNN method [37], uses a
multi-layer neural network whose architecture is determined
by the graph structure. Specifically, each layer obeys the
following propagation rule to aggregate the neighboring fea-
tures:
H(k+1) = σ(Q˜ −
1
2 A˜Q˜ −
1
2 H(k)W (k)), (1)
where A˜ = A + I is the adjacency matrix of the graph
with self-connection added, i.e., I is the identity matrix.
Q˜ − 12 A˜Q˜ − 12 is the symmetric normalized adjacency matrix
and Q˜uu = ∑u A˜uv. Moreover, W (k) is the trainable weight
matrix of the kth layer, and σ(·) is the activation function to
introduce non-linearity, such as ReLU. As the input layer,
we have H(0) = F . When the GCN uses a two-layer neural
network, the GCN model can be described as follows:
softmax(Q˜ −
1
2 A˜Q˜ −
1
2σ(Q˜ −
1
2 A˜Q˜ −
1
2FW (0))W (1)). (2)
Note that two-layer GCN is widely used [37]. In our experi-
ments, we adopt two-layer GCN.
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Table 1: List of notations.
Notation Description
D Target dataset
A Graph of D represented as adjacency matrix
A∗ Partial graph of D
F Nodes’ attributes of D
V Set of nodes of D
f Target model
g Reference model
f (u) u’s posteriors from the target model
g(u) u’s posteriors from the reference model
D ′ Shadow dataset
f ′ Shadow target model
g′ Shadow reference model
K Adversary’s knowledge
d(·, ·) Distance metric
Ψ(·, ·) Pairwise vector operations
e( f (u)) Entropy of f (u)
Prediction in a GNN Model. Since all nodes’ attributes and
the whole graph have been fed into the GNN model in the
training phase, to predict the label of a node, we only need
to provide the node’s ID to the trained model and obtain the
prediction result. We assume the prediction result is a pos-
terior distribution (called posteriors) over the possible labels
for the node. Our work shows that such posteriors reveal rich
information about the graph structure and an adversary can
leverage them to infer whether a pair of nodes are linked or
not in the graph.
We use f to denote the target GNN model and f (u) to rep-
resent the posteriors of node u. For presentation purposes,
we summarize the notations introduced here and in the fol-
lowing sections in Table 1.
3 Problem Formulation
In this section, we first propose a threat model to characterize
an adversary’s background knowledge. Then, we formally
define our link stealing attack.
3.1 Threat Model
Adversary’s Goal. An adversary’s goal is to infer whether
a given pair of nodes u and v are connected in the tar-
get dataset. Inferring links between nodes is a privacy
threat when the links represent sensitive relationship be-
tween users. Moreover, links may be confidential and viewed
as a model owner’s intellectual property because the model
owner may spend lots of resources collecting the links, e.g.,
it requires expensive medical/chemical experiments to deter-
mine the interaction/link between two molecules in a chemi-
cal network. Therefore, inferring links may also compromise
a model owner’s intellectual property.
Adversary’s Background Knowledge. First of all, we as-
sume an adversary has a black-box access to the target GNN
model. In other words, the adversary can only obtain nodes’
posteriors by querying the target model f . This is the most
difficult setting for the adversary [61,62,66]. Then, we char-
acterize an adversary’s background knowledge along three
dimensions:
• Target Dataset’s Nodes’ Attributes, denoted by F .
This background knowledge characterizes whether the
adversary knows nodes’ attributes F in D . We also as-
sume that the adversary knows labels of a small subset
of nodes.
• Target Dataset’s Partial Graph, denoted by A∗. This
dimension characterizes whether the adversary knows a
subset of links in the target dataset D . Since the goal
of link stealing attack is to infer whether there exists an
edge/link between a pair of nodes, the partial graph can
be used as ground truth edges to train the adversary’s
attack model.
• A Shadow Dataset, denoted by D ′. This is a dataset
which contains its own nodes’ attributes and graph. The
adversary can use this to build a GNN model, referred
to as shadow target model (denoted by f ′) in order to
perform a transferring attack. It is worth noting that the
shadow dataset does not need to come from the same
domain of the target dataset. For instance, the shadow
dataset can be a chemical network, while the target
dataset can be a citation network. However, results in
Section 5 show that same-domain shadow dataset in-
deed leads to better transferring attack performance.
We denote the adversary’s background knowledge as a
triplet:
K = (F ,A∗,D ′).
Whether the adversary has each of the three items is a binary
choice, i.e., yes or no. Therefore, we have a comprehensive
taxonomy with 8 different types of background knowledge,
which leads to 8 different link stealing attacks. Table 2 sum-
marizes our attack taxonomy.
3.2 Link Stealing Attack
After describing our threat model, we can formally define
our link stealing attack as follows:
Definition 1 (Link Stealing Attack). Given a black-box ac-
cess to a GNN model that is trained on a target dataset, a
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Table 2: Our comprehensive taxonomy of threat model. F rep-
resents the target dataset’s nodes attributes, A∗ represents the
target dataset’s partial graph, D ′ represents a shadow dataset,
and X (×) means the adversary has (does not have) the knowl-
edge.
Attack F A∗ D ′ Attack F A∗ D ′
Attack-0 × × × Attack-4 × X X
Attack-1 × × X Attack-5 X × X
Attack-2 X × × Attack-6 X X ×
Attack-3 × X × Attack-7 X X X
pair of nodes u and v in the target dataset, and an adver-
sary’s background knowledge K , link stealing attack aims
to infer whether there is a link between u and v in the target
dataset.
4 Attack Taxonomy
In this section, we present the detailed constructions of all
the 8 attacks listed in Table 2. Given different knowledge
K , the adversary can conduct their attacks in different ways.
However, there are two problems that exist across different
attacks.
The first problem is node pair order. As we consider undi-
rected graph, when the adversary wants to predict whether
there is a link between two given nodes u and v, the output
should be the same regardless of the input node pair order.
The second problem is dimension mismatch. The shadow
dataset and the target dataset normally have different dimen-
sions with respect to attributes and posteriors (as they are col-
lected for different classification tasks). For transferring at-
tacks that require the adversary to transfer information from
the shadow dataset to the target dataset, it is crucial to keep
the attack model’s input features’ dimension consistent no
matter which shadow dataset she has.
We will discuss how to solve these two problems during
the description of different attacks. For presentation pur-
poses, features used in our supervised attacks and transfer-
ring attacks are summarised in Table 3.
4.1 Attack Methodologies
Attack-0: K = (×,×,×). We start with the most difficult
setting for the adversary, that is she has no knowledge of the
target dataset’s nodes’ attributes, partial graph, and a shadow
dataset. All she has is the posteriors of nodes obtained from
the target model f (see Section 2).
As introduced in Section 2, GNN essentially aggregates
information for each node from its neighbors. This means
if there is a link between two nodes, then their posteriors
obtained from the target model should be closer. Follow-
ing this intuition, we propose an unsupervised attack. More
specifically, to predict whether there is a link between u and
v , we calculate the distance between their posteriors, i.e.,
d( f (u), f (v)), as the predictor.
We have in total experimented with 8 common distance
metrics: Cosine distance, Euclidean distance, Correlation
distance, Chebyshev distance, Braycurtis distance, Canberra
distance, Manhattan distance, and Square-euclidean dis-
tance. Their formal definitions are in Table 4. It is worth
noting that all distance metrics we adopt are symmetric, i.e.,
d( f (u), f (v)) = d( f (v), f (u)), this naturally solves the prob-
lem of node pair order.
Since the attack is unsupervised, the adversary cannot al-
gorithmically find a threshold to make a concrete prediction,
instead, she needs to make a manual decision depending on
application scenarios. To evaluate our attack, we use AUC
(area under the ROC curve) which considers a set of thresh-
olds as previous works [3,22,27,34,55,62,87] (see Section 5
for more details).
Attack-1: K = (×,×,D ′). In this attack, we broaden the
adversary’s knowledge with a shadow dataset, i.e., D ′. This
means the adversary can train a classifier for a supervised
attack, more specifically, a transferring attack. She first con-
structs a shadow target model f ′ with D ′. Then, she derives
the training data from f ′ to train her attack model.
The adversary cannot directly use the posteriors obtained
from the shadow target model as features to train her at-
tack model, as the shadow dataset and the target dataset very
likely have different numbers of labels, i.e., the correspond-
ing posteriors are in different dimensions. This is the dimen-
sion mismatch problem mentioned before. To tackle this, we
need to design features over posteriors.
As discussed in Attack-0, for any dataset, if two nodes are
linked, then their posteriors obtained from the target model
should be similar. This means if the attack model can capture
the similarity of two nodes’ posteriors from the shadow tar-
get model, it should also be able to transfer the information
to the target model.
We take two approaches together to design features. The
first approach is measuring distances between two nodes’
posteriors. To this end, for each pair of nodes u′ and v′ from
the shadow dataset D ′, we adopt the same set of 8 metrics
used in Attack-0 (formal definitions are listed in Table 4)
to measure their posteriors f ′(u′) and f ′(v′)’s distances, and
concatenate these different distances together. This leads to
an 8-dimension vector.
The second approach is to use entropy to describe each
posterior inspired by previous works [34, 46]. Formally, for
the posterior of node u′ obtained from the shadow target
model f ′, its entropy is defined as the following.
e( f ′(u′)) =−∑
i
f ′i (u
′)log( f ′i (u
′)) (3)
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Table 3: Features adopted by our supervised attacks (Attack-3 and Attack 6) and transferring attacks (Attack-1, Attack-4, Attack-5,
and Attack-7). Here, (∗) means the features are extracted from the shadow dataset in the training phase and (?) means the features
are extracted from both the shadow dataset and the target dataset (its partial graph) in the training phase. d(·, ·) represents distance
metrics defined in Table 4, Ψ(·, ·) represents the pairwise vector operations defined in Table 5. Note that the features used in these
attack models include all the distance metrics and pairwise vector operations.
Attack d( f (u), f (v)) Ψ( f (u), f (v))) Ψ(e( f (u)),e( f (u))) d(g(u),g(v)) Ψ(g(u),g(v)) Ψ(e(g(u)),e(g(v))) d(Fu,Fv) Ψ(Fu,Fv)
Attack-1 ∗ X × X × × × × ×
Attack-3 X X X × × × × ×
Attack-4 ? X × X × × × × ×
Attack-5 ∗ X × X X × X X ×
Attack-6 X X X X X X X X
Attack-7 ? X × X X × X X ×
Table 4: Distance metrics adopted by our attacks, fi(u) rep-
resents the i-th component of f (u). We use f (u) and f (v) to
present these metrics, however, they can be applied to nodes’
attributes and posteriors from the reference model, shadow tar-
get model, and shadow reference model as well.
Metrics Definition
Cosine distance 1− f (u) · f (v)‖ f (u)‖2 ‖ f (v)‖2
Euclidean distance ‖ f (u)− f (v)‖2
Correlation distance 1− ( f (u)− f (u)) · ( f (v)− f (v))‖( f (u)− f (u))‖2‖( f (v)− f (v))‖2
Chebyshev distance maxi | fi(u)− fi(v)|
Braycurtis distance
∑ | fi(u)− fi(v)|
∑ | fi(u)+ fi(v)|
Manhattan distance ∑i | fi(u)− fi(v)|
Canberra distance ∑i
| fi(u)− fi(v)|
| fi(u)|+ | fi(v)|
Sqeuclidean distance ‖ f (u)− f (v)‖22
where f ′i (u′) denotes the i-th element of f ′(u′). Then, for
each pair of nodes u′ and v′ from the shadow dataset, we
obtain two entropies e( f ′(u′)) and e( f ′(v′)). To eliminate
the pair order problems for these entropies, we further take
the approach of Grover and Leskovec [25], by applying pair-
wise vector operation, denoted by Ψ(·, ·). In total, we have
used all the 4 operations defined in Table 5 for our attack.
Note that these operations in Table 5 are applied on two sin-
gle numbers, i.e., scalars, in this attack. However, they can
also be applied to vectors and we will adopt them again on
posteriors and nodes’ attributes in other attacks.
In total, the features used for training the attack model
is assembled with 8 different distances between two nodes’
posteriors from the shadow target model and 4 features ob-
tained from pairwise vector operations between two nodes’
posteriors’ entropies. Regarding labels for the training set,
the adversary uses all the links in D ′ and samples the same
number of node pairs that are not linked (see Section 5 for
more details). We adopt an MLP as our attack model.
Table 5: Pairwise vector operations adopted by our attacks [25],
fi(u) represents the i-th component of f (u). We use f (u) and
f (v) to present these metrics, however, they can be applied
to nodes’ attributes and posteriors from the reference model,
shadow target model, and shadow reference model as well.
Moreover, these operations are also applied to entropies sum-
marized from posteriors.
Operator Definition Operator Definition
Average
fi(u)+ fi(v)
2
Weighted-L1 | fi(u)− fi(v)|
Hadamard fi(u) · fi(v) Weighted-L2 | fi(u)− fi(v)|2
Attack-2: K = (F ,×,×). In this attack, we assume that the
adversary has the knowledge of the target model’s nodes’
attributes F . Since the adversary has no knowledge of the
partial graph and a shadow dataset, her attack here is also
unsupervised (similar to Attack-0). We again rely on the dis-
tance metrics to perform our attack. For each pair of nodes
u and v from the target dataset, we consider four types of
information to measure distance with all the metrics listed
in Table 4. Similar to Attack-0, we experimentally decide
which is the most suitable distance metric for Attack-2.
• d( f (u), f (v)). The first type is the same as the method
for Attack-0, i.e., distance between posteriors of u and
v from the target model f , i.e., f (u) and f (v).
• d(Fu,Fv). The second type is calculating the pairwise
distance over u and v’s attributes Fu and Fv.
• d( f (u), f (v))− d(g(u),g(v)). For the third type, since
we have the target model’s nodes’ attributes (as well as
a subset of their corresponding labels), we train a sep-
arate MLP model, namely reference model (denoted by
g). Our intuition is that if two nodes are connected,
the distance between their posteriors from the target
model should be smaller than the corresponding dis-
tance from the reference model. Therefore, we calcu-
late d( f (u), f (v))−d(g(u),g(v)) to make prediction.
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• d(g(u),g(v)). For the fourth type, we measure the
distance over u and v’s posteriors from the reference
model.
Attack-3: K = (×,A∗,×). In this scenario, the adversary
has access to the partial graph A∗ of the target dataset. For
the attack model, we rely on links from the known partial
graph as the ground truth label to train an attack model (we
again adopt an MLP).
Features used for Attack-3 are summarized in Table 3.
For each pair of nodes u and v from the target dataset, we
calculate the same set of features proposed for Attack-1 on
their posteriors and posteriors’ entropies. Besides, since we
can directly train the attack model on the partial target graph
(i.e., we do not face the dimension mismatch problem), we
further define new features by adopting the pairwise vector
operations listed in Table 5 to f (u) and f (v).
Attack-4: K = (×,A∗,D ′). In this attack, the adversary has
the knowledge of the partial graph A∗ of the target dataset
and a shadow dataset D ′. To take both knowledge into con-
sideration, for each pair of nodes either from the shadow
dataset or the partial graph of the target dataset, we calcu-
late the same set of features over posteriors as proposed in
Attack-1. This means the only difference between Attack-4
and Attack-1 is that the training set for Attack-4 also includes
information from the target dataset’s partial graph (see Ta-
ble 3 for more details).
Different from Attack-3, Attack-4 cannot perform the
pairwise vector operations to f (u) and f (v). This is due to
the dimension mismatch problem as the adversary needs to
take both A∗ and D ′ into account for her attack.
Attack-5: K = (F ,×,D ′). In this attack, the adversary has
the knowledge of the target model’s nodes’ attributes F and
a shadow datasetD ′. As we do not haveA∗ to train the attack
model, we need to rely on the graph of the shadow dataset.
To this end, we first calculate the same set of features used
for Attack-1.
Moreover, as we have the target dataset’s nodes’ attributes,
we further build a reference model (as in Attack-2), and also
a shadow reference model in order to transfer more knowl-
edge from the shadow dataset for the attack. For this, we
build the same set of features as in Attack-1 over the posteri-
ors obtained from the shadow reference model, i.e., the dis-
tance of posteriors (Table 4) and pairwise vector operations
performed on posteriors’ entropies (Table 5). In addition,
we also calculate the 8 different distances over the shadow
dataset’s nodes’ attributes.
Attack-6: K = (F ,A∗,×). In this scenario, the adversary
has the access to target dataset’s nodes’ attributes F and the
partial target graph A∗. As a supervised learning setting, we
build an MLP considering links from the partial graph as the
ground truth label.
The adversary first adopts the same set of features defined
over posteriors obtained from the target model as proposed in
Attack-3. Then, the adversary builds a reference model over
the target dataset’s nodes’ attributes, and calculate the same
set of features over posteriors obtained from the reference
model. In the end, we further calculate the distances of the
target dataset’s nodes’ attributes as another set of features.
Attack-7: K = (F ,A∗,D ′). This is the last attack with
the adversary having all three knowledge, i.e., the target
dataset’s nodes’ attributes F , target dataset’s partial graph
A∗, and a shadow dataset D ′. The set of features for this
attack is the same as the ones used in Attack-5 (Table 3).
The only difference lies in the training phase, we can use the
partial graph from the target dataset together with the graph
from the shadow dataset as the ground truth. We expect this
leads to better performance than the one for Attack-5. How-
ever, this attack also relies on the information of the shadow
dataset, thus, the features used here are a subset of the ones
for Attack-6, this is similar to the difference between Attack-
4 and Attack-3. Note that if the adversary does not take the
shadow dataset into consideration, this scenario is equivalent
to the one for Attack-6.
4.2 Summary
We propose 8 attack scenarios with the combination of the
knowledge that the adversary could have. They could be di-
vided into three categories.
The first category is the unsupervised attacks, including
Attack-0 and Attack-2, where the adversary does not have
the knowledge about the partial graph from the target dataset
or a shadow dataset. In these scenarios, the adversary can use
distance metrics for posteriors or nodes’ attributes to infer
the link.
The second category is the supervised attacks, including
Attack-3 and Attack-6, where the adversary has the knowl-
edge of the partial graph from the target dataset but does not
have a shadow dataset. In these scenarios, the adversary can
use different distances and pairwise vector operations over
nodes’ posteriors (and the corresponding entropies) from the
target model and their attributes to build features as the input
for the attack model.
The third category is the transferring attacks (supervised),
including Attack-1, Attack-4, Attack-5, and Attack-7, where
the adversary has the knowledge of a shadow dataset. In
these scenarios, the adversary can use distance metrics over
posteriors/nodes’ attributes and pairwise operations over
posteriors’ entropies as the bridge to transfer the knowledge
from the shadow dataset to perform link stealing attacks. It is
worth noting that for Attack-4 and Attack-7, if the adversary
leaves the shadow dataset out of consideration, they will not
have the dimension mismatch problem and can take the same
attack methods as Attack-3 and Attack-6, respectively.
6
Table 6: Dataset statistics.
Dataset Type #. Nodes #. Edges #. Classes #. Attributes
AIDS Chemical 31,385 32390 38 4
COX2 Chemical 19,252 20,289 8 3
DHFR Chemical 32,075 33,676 9 3
ENZYMES Chemical 19,580 37,282 3 18
PROTEINS_full Chemical 43,471 81,044 3 29
Citeseer Citation 3,327 4,732 6 3,703
Cora Citation 2,708 5,429 7 1,433
Pubmed Citation 19,717 44,338 3 500
5 Evaluation
This section presents the evaluation results of our 8 attacks.
We first introduce our experimental setup. Then, we present
detailed results for different attacks. Finally, we summarize
our experimental findings.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets. We utilize 8 public datasets, including Cite-
seer [37], Cora [37], Pubmed [37], AIDS [59], COX2 [69],
DHFR [69], ENZYMES [17], and PROTEINS_full [7], to
conduct our experiments. These datasets are widely used as
benchmark datasets for evaluating GNNs [18, 19, 37,75, 80].
Among them, Citeseer, Cora, and Pubmed are citation
datasets with nodes representing publications and links in-
dicating citations among these publications. The other five
datasets are chemical datasets, each node is a molecule and
each link represents the interaction between two molecules.
All these datasets have nodes’ attributes and labels. Table 6
summarizes the general statistics.
Datasets Configuration. For each dataset, we train a tar-
get model and a reference model. In particular, we randomly
sample 10% nodes and use their ground truth labels to train
the target model and the reference model.1 Recall that sev-
eral attacks require the knowledge of the target dataset’s par-
tial graph. To simulate and fairly evaluate different attacks,
we construct an attack dataset which contains node pairs and
labels representing whether they are linked or not. Specifi-
cally, we first select all node pairs that are linked. Then,
we randomly sample the same number of node pairs that are
not linked. Note that such negative sampling method has
been used in previous works [3, 25, 62]. Then, we split the
attack dataset randomly by half into attack training dataset
and attack testing dataset. We use the attack training dataset
to train our attack models when the target dataset’s partial
graph is part of the adversary’s knowledge. We use attack
1Note that we do not train the reference model for attacks when F is
unavailable.
testing dataset to evaluate all our attacks. For the attacks that
have a shadow dataset, we also construct an attack dataset
on the shadow dataset to train the attack model. Note that
we do not split this attack dataset because we do not use it
for evaluation.
Metric. We use AUC (area under the ROC curve) as our
evaluation metric. AUC is frequently used in binary classifi-
cation tasks [3, 22, 27, 34, 51, 52, 55, 62, 85, 87], it is thresh-
old independent and insensitive to label distribution, i.e., the
result of AUC is stable regardless of the percentage of posi-
tive labels in the dataset. For convenience, we refer to node
pairs that are linked as positive node pairs and those that are
not linked as negative node pairs. If we rank node pairs ac-
cording to the probability that there is a link between them,
then AUC is the probability that a randomly selected posi-
tive node pair ranks higher than a randomly selected negative
node pair. Note that when performing random guessing, i.e.,
we rank all node pairs uniformly at random, the AUC value
is 0.5.
Models. We use a graph convolutional network with 1 hid-
den layer for both the target model and the shadow target
model, and assume they share the same architecture (see Sec-
tion 3). The number of neurons in the hidden layer is set to
16. We adopt the frequently used ReLU and softmax as ac-
tivation functions for the hidden layer and the output layer,
respectively. Note that we append Dropout (the rate is 0.5) to
the output of the hidden layer to prevent overfitting. We train
100 epochs with a learning rate of 0.01. Cross-entropy is
adopted as the loss function and we use the Adam optimizer
to update the model parameters. Our GNNs are implemented
based on publicly available code.2
We use an MLP with 1 hidden layer as the reference model
and the shadow reference model. Hyperparameters, includ-
ing number of neurons in the hidden layer, activation func-
tions, loss function, optimizer, epochs, and learning rate are
the same as those of the target model.
We use an MLP with 2 hidden layers as our attack model.
The number of neurons for both hidden layers is 32. ReLU
is adopted as the activation function for hidden layers and
softmax is used as the output activation function. We again
append Dropout (the rate is 0.5) to each hidden layer to pre-
vent overfitting. We train 50 epochs with a learning rate of
0.001. The loss function is cross-entropy and the optimizer
is Adam.
We run all experiments with this setting for 5 times and
report the average value and the standard deviation of AUC
scores. Note that for Attack-0 and Attack-2, the AUC scores
keep the same since these two attacks are unsupervised.
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Table 7: Average AUC with standard deviation for Attack-1 on all the 8 datasets. Best results are highlighted in bold.
Shadow Dataset
Target Dataset AIDS COX2 DHFR ENZYMES PROTEINS_full Citeseer Cora Pubmed
AIDS - 0.720 ± 0.009 0.690 ± 0.005 0.730 ± 0.010 0.720 ± 0.005 0.689 ± 0.019 0.650 ± 0.025 0.667 ± 0.014
COX2 0.755 ± 0.032 - 0.831 ± 0.005 0.739 ± 0.116 0.832 ± 0.009 0.762 ± 0.009 0.773 ± 0.008 0.722 ± 0.024
DHFR 0.689 ± 0.004 0.771 ± 0.004 - 0.577 ± 0.044 0.701 ± 0.010 0.736 ± 0.005 0.740 ± 0.003 0.663 ± 0.010
ENZYMES 0.747 ± 0.014 0.695 ± 0.023 0.514 ± 0.041 - 0.691 ± 0.030 0.680 ± 0.012 0.663 ± 0.009 0.637 ± 0.018
PROTEINS_full 0.775 ± 0.020 0.821 ± 0.016 0.528 ± 0.038 0.822 ± 0.020 - 0.823 ± 0.004 0.809 ± 0.015 0.809 ± 0.013
Citeseer 0.801 ± 0.040 0.920 ± 0.006 0.842 ± 0.036 0.846 ± 0.042 0.848 ± 0.015 - 0.965 ± 0.001 0.942 ± 0.003
Cora 0.791 ± 0.019 0.884 ± 0.005 0.811 ± 0.024 0.804 ± 0.048 0.869 ± 0.012 0.942 ± 0.001 - 0.917 ± 0.002
Pubmed 0.705 ± 0.039 0.796 ± 0.007 0.704 ± 0.042 0.708 ± 0.067 0.752 ± 0.014 0.883 ± 0.006 0.885 ± 0.005 -
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Figure 1: AUC for Attack-0 on all the 8 datasets with all the
8 distance metrics. The x-axis represents the dataset and the
y-axis represents the AUC score.
5.2 Attack Performance in Different Scenar-
ios
Attack-0: K = (×,×,×). In this attack, the adversary only
relies on measuring the distance of two nodes’ posteriors ob-
tained from the target model. We compare 8 different dis-
tance metrics and Figure 1 shows the results. First, we ob-
serve that Correlation distance achieves the best performance
followed by Cosine distance across all datasets. In contrast,
Canberra distance performs the worst. For instance, on the
Citeseer dataset, the AUC scores for Correlation distance and
Cosine distance are 0.959 and 0.946, respectively, while the
AUC score for Canberra distance is 0.801. Note that both
Correlation distance and Cosine distance measure the inner
product between two vectors, or the “angle” of two vectors
while other distance metrics do not. Second, we find that
the performance of the same metric on different datasets is
different. For instance, the AUC of Correlation distance on
Citeseer is 0.959 compared to 0.635 on ENZYMES.
2https://github.com/tkipf/gcn
Figure 2 shows the frequency of Correlation distance com-
puted on posteriors obtained from the target model for both
positive node pairs and negative node pairs in attack testing
datasets. The x-axis is the value of Correlation distance and
the y-axis is the number of pairs. A clear trend is that for
all datasets, the Correlation distance for positive node pairs
is much smaller than negative node pairs. In other words, on
average, the posteriors for positive node pairs are “closer”
than that for negative node pairs. This verifies our intuition
presented in Section 4: GNN can be considered as an ag-
gregation function over the neighborhoods, if two nodes are
linked, they aggregate with each other’s features and there-
fore become closer.
Attack-1: K = (×,×,D ′). In this attack, the adversary can
leverage a shadow dataset. In particular, for each dataset,
we use one of the remaining datasets as the shadow dataset
to perform the attack. Table 7 summarizes the results. We
leave the blank in the diagonal because we do not use the
target dataset itself as its shadow dataset. As we can see from
Table 7, the AUC scores from the best performing shadow
dataset have a consistent improvement on almost all datasets
compared to Attack-0. One exception is the COX2 dataset in
which the AUC score decreases by 0.02. The results indicate
that adversary can indeed transfer the knowledge from the
shadow dataset to enhance her attack.
An interesting finding is that for a chemical dataset, the
best shadow dataset is normally a chemical dataset as well.
Similar results can be observed for citation datasets. This
shows that it is more effective to transfer knowledge across
datasets from the same domain. To better understand this,
we extract the attack model’s last hidden layer’s output
(32-dimension) for positive node pairs and negative node
pairs and project them into a 2-dimension space using t-
Distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) [74].
Figure 3a shows the results for Citeseer when using Cora
as the shadow dataset, both of which are citation datasets.
We can see that the positive (negative) node pairs from both
the target dataset and the shadow dataset can be clustered
into similar position, which indicates the positive (negative)
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Figure 2: The Correlation distance distribution between nodes’ posteriors for positive node pairs and negative node pairs on all the
8 datasets. The x-axis represents Correlation distance and the y-axis represents the number of node pairs.
Negative Node Pairs of Cora Positive Node Pairs of Cora
Negative Node Pairs of Citeseer Positive Node Pairs of Citeseer
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Figure 3: The last hidden layer’s output from the attack model of Attack-1 for 200 randomly sampled positive node pairs and 200
randomly sampled negative node pairs projected into a 2-dimension space using t-SNE. (a) Cora as the shadow dataset and Citeseer
as the target dataset, (b) Cora as the shadow dataset and ENZYMES as the target dataset.
node pairs from both datasets have similar distributions. This
means if the attack model learns a decision boundary to sep-
arate positive nodes pairs from the negative node pairs on the
shadow dataset, this decision boundary can be easily carried
over to the target dataset as well.
In contrast, Figure 3b shows the results for ENZYMES
(a chemical dataset) when using Cora (a citation dataset) as
the shadow dataset. We see that the positive (negative) node
pairs from the shadow dataset and the target dataset are dis-
tributed differently in the 2-dimension space. For example,
the positive node pairs for Cora are clustered into the outer
space of the circle area whereas the positive node pairs for
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Figure 4: Average AUC for Attack-2 on all the 8 datasets with
all the 4 types of information considered. The x-axis represents
the dataset and the y-axis represents the AUC score.
ENZYMES are clustered into the inner space of the circle
area. Therefore, it is hard for the adversary to perform an
effective transferring attack. The underlying reason for this
to happen is that graphs from the same domain have analo-
gous graph structures and similar features. This leads to less
information loss for our transferring attack.
Attack-2: K = (F ,×,×). In Attack-2, the adversary has
the knowledge of the target dataset’s nodes’ attributes F . As
discussed in Section 4, she trains a reference model g by
herself from F . We compare four types of information men-
tioned in Section 4, and the results are shown in Figure 4. It
is worth noting that we only show the results calculated with
Correlation distance out of the 8 distance metrics (Table 4)
since Correlation distance achieves the best performance in
almost all settings. We can see that in all chemical datasets
and one citation dataset, using the distance of target dataset’s
nodes’ attributes leads to the best performance. For the other
two citation datasets, using the distance between posteriors
of the target model can get better performance. Nodes’ at-
tributes’ dimensions are higher in citation datasets than in
chemical datasets as shown in Table 6. In other words, the
node attributes for citation datasets are sparser. For instance,
we observe that most attributes are 0 in citation datasets.
Therefore, we conclude that the attack can get better perfor-
mance using the Correlation distance between posteriors of
the target model when the target dataset’s nodes’ attributes
are in high dimension.
Attack-3: K = (×,A∗,×). Table 8 shows the results for
this attack. With the knowledge of the target dataset’s par-
tial graph, the average AUC score for all cases is over 0.9.
Compared to Attack-2, the AUC scores on chemical datasets
have an improvement over 10% and the AUC scores on cita-
tion datasets have an improvement over 2%.3
3Attack-2 already achieves relatively high AUC on citation datasets.
Table 8: Average AUC with standard deviation for Attack-3 on
all the 8 datasets.
Dataset AUC Dataset AUC
AIDS 0.961 ± 0.001 PROTEINS_full 0.958 ± 0.000
COX2 0.939 ± 0.002 Citeseer 0.973 ± 0.000
DHFR 0.934 ± 0.001 Cora 0.954 ± 0.001
ENZYMES 0.882 ± 0.001 Pubmed 0.947 ± 0.001
Compared to Attack-1 and Attack-2, Attack-3 achieves the
best performance, this indicates the target dataset’s partial
graph is the most important component for an adversary for
performing a link stealing attack. The reason is that the par-
tial graph contains the ground truth links in the target dataset,
which can be directly exploited by the attack model.
Attack-4: K = (×,A∗,D ′). Table 9 shows the results for
Attack-4. First, compared to Attack-1 (K = (×,×,D ′)), the
overall performance of Attack-4 improves with the help of
target dataset’s partial graph A∗. This is reasonable since
the target dataset’s partial graph contains some ground truth
links from the target dataset. Second, we note that the
performances of Attack-4 are worse than Attack-3 (K =
(×,A∗,×)). Intuitively, the performance should be better
since Attack-4 has more background knowledge. The rea-
son for the performance degradation is that we do not take
the pairwise vector operation (Table 5) over posteriors as the
input for Attack-4 since we want to learn information from
both the target dataset and the shadow dataset, and need to
eliminate the dimension mismatch issue (as discussed in Sec-
tion 4). Moreover, the results also indicate that compared to
the shadow dataset, the target dataset’s partial graph is more
informative.
Attack-5: K = (F ,×,D ′). In Attack-5, the adversary has
the knowledge of target dataset’s nodes’ attributes as well as
a shadow dataset, evaluation results are shown in Table 10.
We observe that Attack-5 performs better than both Attack-
1 (only with D ′) and Attack-2 (only with F ). This shows
the combination of F and D ′ can lead to a better link steal-
ing performance. Furthermore, we observe similar trends as
for Attack-1, that is the attack performs better if the shadow
dataset comes from the same domain as the target dataset.
Attack-6: K = (F ,A∗,×). The result of Attack-6 on all
datasets is shown in Table 12. We can see that for almost
all datasets (except ENZYMES), the AUC scores are over
0.95, which means this attack achieves an excellent perfor-
mance.4 In particular, the AUC score is nearly 1 on PRO-
TEINS_full. Moreover, Attack-6 consistently outperforms
Attack-2 (K = (F ,×,×)). This further validates the ef-
fectiveness of A∗ in helping the adversary to infer links.
4http://gim.unmc.edu/dxtests/roc3.htm
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Table 9: Average AUC with standard deviation for Attack-4 on all the 8 datasets. Best results are highlighted in bold.
Shadow Dataset
Target Dataset AIDS COX2 DHFR ENZYMES PROTEINS_full Citeseer Cora Pubmed
AIDS - 0.750 ± 0.009 0.763 ± 0.010 0.733 ± 0.007 0.557 ± 0.009 0.729 ± 0.015 0.702 ± 0.010 0.673 ± 0.009
COX2 0.802 ± 0.031 - 0.866 ± 0.004 0.782 ± 0.012 0.561 ± 0.030 0.860 ± 0.002 0.853 ± 0.004 0.767 ± 0.023
DHFR 0.758 ± 0.022 0.812 ± 0.005 - 0.662 ± 0.030 0.578 ± 0.067 0.799 ± 0.002 0.798 ± 0.009 0.736 ± 0.005
ENZYMES 0.741 ± 0.010 0.684 ± 0.024 0.670 ± 0.008 - 0.733 ± 0.019 0.624 ± 0.002 0.627 ± 0.014 0.691 ± 0.012
PROTEINS_full 0.715 ± 0.009 0.802 ± 0.025 0.725 ± 0.041 0.863 ± 0.010 - 0.784 ± 0.031 0.815 ± 0.012 0.867 ± 0.003
Citeseer 0.832 ± 0.078 0.940 ± 0.005 0.914 ± 0.007 0.879 ± 0.062 0.833 ± 0.088 - 0.967 ± 0.001 0.955 ± 0.003
Cora 0.572 ± 0.188 0.899 ± 0.003 0.887 ± 0.014 0.878 ± 0.045 0.738 ± 0.168 0.945 ± 0.001 - 0.924 ± 0.005
Pubmed 0.777 ± 0.056 0.893 ± 0.001 0.90 ± 0.006 0.866 ± 0.002 0.806 ± 0.042 0.907 ± 0.004 0.902 ± 0.001 -
Table 10: Average AUC with standard deviation for Attack-5 on all the 8 datasets. Best results are highlighted in bold.
Shadow Dataset
Target Dataset AIDS COX2 DHFR ENZYMES PROTEINS_full Citeseer Cora Pubmed
AIDS - 0.841 ± 0.003 0.846 ± 0.009 0.795 ± 0.016 0.875 ± 0.002 0.839 ± 0.006 0.793 ± 0.015 0.787 ± 0.008
COX2 0.832 ± 0.036 - 0.977 ± 0.002 0.874 ± 0.020 0.946 ± 0.003 0.911 ± 0.004 0.908 ± 0.004 0.887 ± 0.004
DHFR 0.840 ± 0.018 0.988 ± 0.001 - 0.757 ± 0.032 0.970 ± 0.004 0.909 ± 0.010 0.911 ± 0.009 0.860 ± 0.004
ENZYMES 0.639 ± 0.005 0.581 ± 0.010 0.587 ± 0.005 - 0.608 ± 0.001 0.685 ± 0.005 0.674 ± 0.007 0.663 ± 0.002
PROTEINS_full 0.948 ± 0.007 0.981 ± 0.004 0.968 ± 0.014 0.818 ± 0.017 - 0.970 ± 0.002 0.876 ± 0.010 0.885 ± 0.003
Citeseer 0.773 ± 0.048 0.666 ± 0.018 0.652 ± 0.020 0.860 ± 0.049 0.794 ± 0.009 - 0.969 ± 0.002 0.967 ± 0.001
Cora 0.743 ± 0.017 0.587 ± 0.012 0.568 ± 0.009 0.778 ± 0.052 0.686 ± 0.018 0.956 ± 0.001 - 0.936 ± 0.002
Pubmed 0.777 ± 0.030 0.661 ± 0.018 0.645 ± 0.008 0.786 ± 0.041 0.741 ± 0.008 0.938 ± 0.007 0.941 ± 0.007 -
Table 11: Average AUC with standard deviation for Attack-7 on all the 8 datasets. Best results are highlighted in bold.
Shadow Dataset
Target Dataset AIDS COX2 DHFR ENZYMES PROTEINS_full Citeseer Cora Pubmed
AIDS - 0.925 ± 0.001 0.913 ± 0.005 0.784 ± 0.010 0.848 ± 0.010 0.538 ± 0.022 0.520 ± 0.011 0.849 ± 0.004
COX2 0.954 ± 0.007 - 0.982 ± 0.001 0.874 ± 0.010 0.898 ± 0.030 0.947 ± 0.003 0.940 ± 0.007 0.875 ± 0.034
DHFR 0.982 ± 0.002 0.992 ± 0.00 - 0.871 ± 0.017 0.966 ± 0.008 0.933 ± 0.008 0.947 ± 0.012 0.937 ± 0.003
ENZYMES 0.698 ± 0.007 0.691 ± 0.008 0.671 ± 0.003 - 0.610 ± 0.001 0.657 ± 0.009 0.662 ± 0.006 0.677 ± 0.001
PROTEINS_full 0.984 ± 0.002 0.962 ± 0.010 0.986 ± 0.002 0.993 ± 0.001 - 0.840 ± 0.013 0.823 ± 0.006 0.987 ± 0.005
Citeseer 0.816 ± 0.048 0.791 ± 0.033 0.702 ± 0.025 0.880 ± 0.057 0.902 ± 0.026 - 0.977 ± 0.000 0.964 ± 0.000
Cora 0.746 ± 0.068 0.680 ± 0.038 0.574 ± 0.038 0.888 ± 0.014 0.695 ± 0.10 0.960 ± 0.001 - 0.935 ± 0.001
Pubmed 0.807 ± 0.016 0.712 ± 0.025 0.710 ± 0.006 0.881 ± 0.009 0.739 ± 0.012 0.956 ± 0.001 0.949 ± 0.001 -
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Table 12: Average AUC with standard deviation for Attack-6
on all the 8 datasets.
Dataset AUC Dataset AUC
AIDS 0.979 ± 0.001 PROTEINS_full 0.999 ± 0.000
COX2 0.987 ± 0.001 Citeseer 0.981 ± 0.000
DHFR 0.992 ± 0.001 Cora 0.964 ± 0.000
ENZYMES 0.891 ± 0.001 Pubmed 0.970 ± 0.000
Another finding is that for chemical datasets, the informa-
tion of target dataset’s partial graph brings a larger improve-
ment than the citation datasets. One possible explanation is
that the nodes’ attributes in chemical datasets contain less
information (they are in lower dimension), thus the target
dataset’s partial graph contributes more to the final predic-
tion performance.
Attack-7: K = (F ,A∗,D ′). The results of Attack-7 are
summarized in Table 11. Compared to Attack-5 (K =
(F ,×,D ′)), the overall performances improve with the help
of A∗. We would expect the adversary’s accuracy is better
than that of Attack-6 (K = (F ,A∗,×)) since she has more
background knowledge. However, we observe that the per-
formance drops from Attack-6 to Attack-7. We suspect this
is due to the fact that we want to learn information from both
the target dataset and the shadow dataset, to avoid the dimen-
sion mismatch problem, Attack-7 uses fewer features than
Attack-6 (similar to the reason that Attack-4 performs worse
than Attack-3).
Comparison with Link Prediction. We further compare all
our attacks with a traditional link prediction method [41].
More specifically, we build an MLP with features summa-
rized from the target model’s partial graph, including Com-
mon neighbor, Jaccard index, and Preferential attachment
(formal definition can be found in Appendix A). As we can
see from Figure 6, most of our attacks outperforms the link
prediction method. For instance, on the COX2 dataset, all
our 8 attacks outperform the link prediction model, the best
attack (Attack-6) achieves more than 20% performance gain.
This demonstrates that GNNs lead to more severe privacy
risks than traditional link prediction.
Attack Robustness. Previous experiments are based on the
setting that we evenly split the attack dataset to attack train-
ing dataset and attack testing dataset. However, we want to
know whether our attacks still work with different size of
training data. To this end, we vary the ratio of attack train-
ing data from 10% to 90% in the attack dataset and eval-
uate all attacks’ AUC scores on the same remaining 10%
of the dataset. The results are depicted in Figure 5. First,
for Attack-0 and Attack-2, the overall AUC scores stay the
same with different ratios of attack training data since they
only calculate the AUC score with Correlation distance over
the attack testing data. Second, for Attack-3 and Attack-6
where the adversary uses the target dataset’s partial graph
to train the attack model, the overall AUC scores are stable
with a small increase. This demonstrates that only a small
fraction of the target dataset’s graph is enough to conduct
high-performing attacks. For the transferring attacks, i.e.,
Attack-1, Attack-4, Attack-5, and Attack-7, although they
are fluctuating when varying the size of attack training data
compared to other attacks, their overall performances are still
relatively high.
5.3 Summary of Results
In summary, we have made the following observations from
our experimental results.
• Our attacks can effectively steal the links from GNNs.
For instance, our Attack-6 can achieve average AUC
scores over 0.95 on 7 out of 8 datasets, which demon-
strate that the GNNs are vulnerable to our attacks.
• Generally speaking, the performances of the attack are
better if there is more background knowledge as shown
in Figure 6. However, we find the impact of differ-
ent knowledge is different. In particular, the target
dataset’s partial graph is the most informative. For in-
stance, Attack-3 (K = (×,A∗,×)) significantly outper-
forms Attack-1 (K = (×,×,D ′)) and Attack-2 (K =
(F ,×,×)).
• Our transferring attack can achieve good performance.
Furthermore, we find that our transferring attack
achieves better performance when the shadow dataset
and the target dataset are from the same domain as val-
idated by experimental results for Attack-1 and Attack-
5.
6 Related Work
Membership Inference. In membership inference at-
tacks [8, 29, 43, 46, 47, 62, 66, 68, 81], the adversary aims to
infer whether a data sample is in the target model’s training
dataset or not. Shokri et al. [66] propose the first member-
ship inference attacks against ML models and demonstrate
its relationship with model overfitting. Salem et al. [62] fur-
ther show membership inference attacks are broadly appli-
cable at low cost via relaxing assumptions on the adversary.
To mitigate attacks, many empirical defenses [34, 46, 62, 66]
have been proposed. For instance, Nasr et al. [46] propose
to mitigate attacks via formulating the defense as a min-max
optimization problem which tries to decrease the accuracy
loss and increase the membership privacy. Salem et al. [62]
explore dropout and model stacking to mitigate membership
12
20% 40% 60% 80%
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
AU
C
AIDS
20% 40% 60% 80%
0.800
0.825
0.850
0.875
0.900
0.925
0.950
0.975
1.000
COX2
20% 40% 60% 80%
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
DHFR
20% 40% 60% 80%
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
ENZYMES
20% 40% 60% 80%
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
AU
C
PROTEINS_full
20% 40% 60% 80%
0.86
0.88
0.90
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1.00
Citeseer
20% 40% 60% 80%
0.800
0.825
0.850
0.875
0.900
0.925
0.950
0.975
1.000
Cora
20% 40% 60% 80%
0.86
0.88
0.90
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1.00
Pubmed
Attack-0 Attack-1 Attack-2 Attack-3 Attack-4 Attack-5 Attack-6 Attack-7
Figure 5: The relationship between the ratio of attack training dataset in the attack dataset and the attacks’ AUC scores on all the 8
datasets. The x-axis represents the ratio and the y-axis represents the AUC score.
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inference attacks. More recently, Jia et al. [34] leverage ad-
versarial examples to fool the adversary and show their de-
fense has a formal utility guarantee. Other attacks in this
space study membership inference in natural language pro-
cessing models [67], generative models [10, 29], federated
learning [45], biomedical and location data [27, 55, 56].
Model Inversion. In model inversion attacks [21,22,45,53],
the adversary aims to learn sensitive attributes of training
data from target models. For example, Fredrikson et al. [22]
propose the model inversion attack in which adversary can
infer the patient’s genetic markers given the model and some
demographic information about the patients. Fredrikson et
al. [21] further explore the model inversion attacks on de-
cision trees and neural networks via exploiting the confi-
dence score values revealed along with predictions. Melis
et al. [45] revealed that in the collaborative learning scenar-
ios, when the target model updated with new training data,
the adversary could infer sensitive attributes about the new
training data.
Model Extraction. In model extraction attacks [1, 9, 33,
72, 73, 76, 84], the adversary aims to steal the parameters
of a certain target model or mimic its behaviors. Tramér et
al. [72] show that an adversary can exactly recover the tar-
get model’s parameters via solving the equations for certain
models, e.g., linear models. Wang and Gong [76] propose
attacks to steal the hyperparameters and show their attacks
are broadly applicable to a variety of machine learning algo-
rithms, e.g., ridge regression and SVM. Orekondy et al. [48]
propose a functionality stealing attack aiming at mimicking
the behaviors of the target model. Concretely, they query
the target model and use the query-prediction pairs to train
a “knockoff” model. Jagielski et al. [33] improve the query
efficiency of learning-based model extraction attacks and de-
velop the practical functionally-equivalent model whose pre-
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dictions are identical to target model on all inputs without
training model’s weights. Some defenses [36, 49] have been
proposed to defend against model extraction attacks. For in-
stance, Juuti et al. [36] propose to detect malicious queries
via analyzing the distribution of consecutive API queries and
raises an alarm when the distribution different from benign
queries. Orekondy et al [49] propose a utility-constrained
defense against neural network model stealing attacks via
adding perturbations to the output of the target model.
Adversarial Attacks on Graph Neural Networks. Some
recent studies [5, 15, 77, 78, 89, 90] show that GNNs are vul-
nerable to adversarial attacks. In particular, the adversary
can fool GNNs via manipulating the graph structure and/or
node features. For instance, Zügner et al. [89] introduce
adversarial attacks to attributed graphs and focus on both
training and testing phase. In particular, their attacks tar-
get both node’s features and graph structure and show that
the node classification accuracy drops with a few perturba-
tions. Bojchevski et al. [5] analyze the vulnerability of node
embeddings to graph structure perturbation via solving a bi-
level optimization problem based on eigenvalue perturbation
theory. Zügner and Günnemann [90] investigate training
time attacks on GNNs for node classification via treating the
graph as a hyperparameter to optimize. Wang and Gong [77]
propose attack to evade collective classification based classi-
fier via perturbing the graph structure, which can also trans-
fer to GNNs. Dai et al. [15] propose to fool the GNNs via
manipulating the combinatorial structure of data and try to
learn generalizable attack policy via reinforcement learning.
These studies are different from our work since we aim to
steal links from GNNs.
To mitigate attacks, many defenses [6,78,88,91] have been
proposed. For instance, Zhu et al. [88] propose to enhance
the robustness of GCNs via using Gaussian distributions in
graph convolutional layers to mitigate the effects of adver-
sarial attacks and leveraged attention mechanism to impede
the propagation of attacks. Zügner and Günnemann [91]
propose a learning principle that improves the robustness of
the GNNs and show provable robustness guarantees against
nodes’ attributes perturbation. Bojchevski et al. [5] propose
to certify the robustness against graph structure perturbation
for a general class of models, e.g., GNNs, via exploiting con-
nections to PageRank and Markov decision processes. These
defenses are designed to improve the robustness of GNNs
rather than preventing the privacy leakage of it.
We note that there are also some attacks and defenses on
graph that focus on non-GNN models [11, 35]. For instance,
Chen et al. [11] propose attacks that mislead the behavior of
graph-cluster algorithm and show some practical defenses.
Jia et al. [35] propose certified defense which is based on
randomized smoothing to defend against adversarial struc-
tural attacks to community detection.
7 Conclusion
Many real-world data can be organized in the form of graphs.
In recent years, graph neural networks have been proposed
to leverage the rich graph data for building powerful appli-
cations. Classical ML models are shown to be vulnerable
to various security and privacy attacks. However, whether
GNNs exhibit similar risks is left largely unexplored.
In this paper, we propose the first link stealing attacks
against GNNs. More specifically, the adversary aims at infer-
ring whether there is a link between two nodes from a trained
GNN. We characterize three types of knowledge an adver-
sary can have, including the target dataset’s nodes’ attributes,
the target dataset’s partial graph, and a shadow dataset. By
jointly considering them, we define 8 types of link steal-
ing attacks, and propose novel methods to realize these at-
tacks. Extensive evaluation over a set of 8 real-world datasets
shows that our attacks achieve strong performance. More-
over, we make multiple interesting observations, such as the
target dataset’s partial graph is the most informative predic-
tor. For our transferring attacks, a shadow dataset which
comes from the same domain as the target dataset leads to
a better attack performance. We hope that our results can
shed light on the security and privacy risks stemming from
graph neural networks.
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A Appendix
The formal definitions of Common neighbor, Jaccard index,
and Preferential attachment for u and v are as follows. We
use N(u) to denote the set of neighbors for u in the target
dataset’s partial graph.
• Common neighbor. |N(u)∩N(v)|
• Jaccard index. |N(u)∩N(v)||N(u)∪N(v)|
• Preferential attachment. |N(u)| · |N(v)|
19
